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Abstract 
Once the system is compromised, the forensics and investigation are always executed after the attacks and the 
loss of some useful instant evidence. Since there is no log information necessary for analyzing an attack cause 
after the cyber incident occurs, it is difficult to analyze the cause of an intrusion even after an intrusion event is 
recognized. Moreover, in an advanced cyber incident such as advanced persistent threats, several months or 
more are expended in only analyzing a cause, and it is difficult to find the cause with conventional security 
equipment. In this paper, we introduce a network intrusion forensics system for collecting and preserving the 
evidence of an intrusion, it is called Cyber Black Box that is deployed in Local Area Network environment. It 
quickly analyzes a cause of an intrusion event when the intrusion event occurs, and provides a function of 
collecting evidence data of the intrusion event. The paper also describes the experimental results of the network 
throughput performance by deploying our proposed system in an experimental testbed environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, cyber-attacks against public communications networks are getting more sophisticated intelligent and 
varied. Moreover, in some cases, one local domain could make systematic attacks against another domain to 
steal its confidential information and intellectual property. Therefore, the issue of cyber-attacks is now regarded 
as a new major threat to national security. The conventional way of operating individual information security 
systems such as IDS (Intrusion Detection System) and IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) may not be sufficient 
to cope with those attacks committed by highly-motivated attackers with significant resources. For real-time 
response cyber threats, not only individual security system, but also global cooperative security management 
system should be provided since there are global problems which cannot be solved by any single entity as well 
as single domain or single company. For a systematic response to the cyber threat, the level of threats, the level 
of risk assessment, and a step-by-step alarm are required. 
Table 1: Description of Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFATs) (Pilli et al., 2010)
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Current cyber incident response is always after the attacks occur, which always lose some important data of the 
intrusion. To solve these security issues, we need some new approaches to enhance the investigation of the 
network attack. A generic process model for network forensics is proposed which is built on various existing 
models of digital forensics. Computer Forensics deals with the collection and analysis of data from computer 
systems, networks, communication streams and storage media in an admissible manner (Osles, L., 2001). 
Otherwise, network forensics deals with capture, recording, and analysis of network traffic for detecting 
intrusions and investigating them in order to discover evidential information about the source of security attacks 
(Gary, P., 2001). 
The functionality of various Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFATs) and network security monitoring tools, 
available for forensics examiners is discussed in (Pilli et al., 2010). Computer forensic is the science of 
acquiring, preserving, retrieving, and presenting data that has been processed electronically and stored on 
computer media (Osles, L., 2001). Network forensics is commonly used to describe the task of analyzing 
information collected on active networks from various intrusion detection, auditing, and monitoring capabilities 
for the purpose of protection. The network forensics tools always combine the ability to passively monitor, 
capture all network traffic, analyze traffic, track down security violations and protect against future violations 
and attacks. The essential functions of network forensics tool is to capture network traffic, to analyze the traffic 
according to the user’s needs, to discover useful and interesting things about the analyzed traffic (Corey et al., 
2002; Reith et al., 2002; Manzano et al., 2001; Davidoff et al., 2012). For the purpose of the network forensics, 
we always need the logging system to capture the network traffic fully. There are many tools for building 
network traffic analysis and statistical event records (Ioannidis et al., 2002; McCanne et al., 1993; Anagnostakis 
et al., 2001; Risso et al., 2001). They often use a promiscuous packet interface to pass visible traffic into an 
internally decision engine which discloses the content of the packets and counting them into statistical data and 
logging key details into backend disks (Rizzo et al., 2012; Deri et al., 2013). In our system, we will use the 
logging approach for the information gathering, including network flow, windows PE (Portable Executable) files 
and so on. After obtaining the network traffic data, forensics analysis is needed. In this paper, we present the 
architecture of a real time network intrusion forensics system, which can expedite the investigation of the 
incident and improve the ability of emergence response. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: 
First, technical goals and design approaches of the system are discussed. And then the system architecture and 
technical functions are described, we explain the experimental results and give the conclusion in the last section. 
TECHNICAL GOALS AND DESIGN APPROACHES 
Cyber Black Box System Goals  
In the network security field, a cyber intrusion event denotes a case of attacking an information communication 
network and a system associated with the information communication network in a way such as hacking, a 
computer virus, a logic bomb, a mail bomb, and so on. In the related works, since analysis is mainly used as an 
action against a cyber intrusion event, there are limitations in quick cause analysis and post-action. They cannot 
give a complete picture for the forensics analysis when the attacks are end. In addition, since there is no log 
information necessary for analyzing an attack cause after the cyber incident occurs, it is difficult to analyze the 
cause of an attack.  
 
Figure 1: Technical design of cyber black box for network forensics 
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Accordingly, the goals of our cyber black box system are security response and forensics. It quickly analyzes a 
cause of an intrusion event when the intrusion event occurs, and provides a function of collecting evidence data 
of the intrusion event. Figure 1 shows that the cyber black box system includes a data collector configured to 
collect entire packet data, flow data, and a portable executable (PE) file from monitored network traffic and a 
server configured to analyze a cause of a cyber intrusion event and reproduce the cyber intrusion event, based on 
the collected entire packet data, flow data, and PE file. It also provides the process in data on the authenticity, 
integrity, reliability, originality, such as the securing by the evidence legally binding. 
Traffic & Flow Information Gathering 
The proposed system saves the audit data and digests information of the intrusion. It can gather the network 
traffic and flow data (e.g., Netflow), and send to the forensics server. Network traffic capture may become the 
bottleneck of the system when the traffic is huge, but the waiving of the some traffic may result in the losing of 
trace or evidence. The solution of the trade-off depends on the burden of real time traffic. We developed a 
network interface card dealing with 10Gbps traffic without loss of traffic data. It may encode the entire packet 
data, the flow data, and the PE file which are stored in the buffer as a file having the PCAP format. It may also 
store the entire packet data, the flow data, and the PE file, which are encoded by the encoding unit in units of a 
file, as the preservation data. 
Transmitted File Reconstruction 
The proposed system performs the function of reconstructing the transmitted file which is extracted from the 
stored traffic data collected by the cyber black box system, and performs a function for storing additional 
metadata that is collected from one file reconfiguration. When a network packet is arrived, it is confirmed 
whether the packet includes a PE file or not. If it is, then the packet is collected to reconstruct the PE file from 
the packet payload. For reconstructing the correct file, the TCP reassemble functionality has been implemented 
as well. Once a PE file is constructed, the file is examined by header analysis technology. Header analysis 
technology detects malwares based on the information of PE header. There is lots of information in PE header 
for executing a file. 
Virtual Volume based Storage Management 
Virtual volume management is performed solely for the storage device. Storing the collected data provides 
several APIs to execute the traffic information gathering module. The proposed system performs a function to 
provide the integrity of the data when stored in the virtual volume storage to preserve the collected data for the 
evidence of attacks. Moreover, the storage management supports a write once read many (WROM) function. It 
can be understood that the storage unit supporting the WORM function is a storage medium in which data is 
written once and from which the data is read a plurality of times like CD-ROMs. Therefore, the storage unit may 
preserve the entire packet data, the flow data, and the PE file for a long time. 
Cyber Incident Cause Analysis 
Cyber incident cause analysis may request the preserved data and management data from a data collector. Here, 
the preserved data may include the decoded entire packet data, flow data, PE file, and metadata associated with 
the PE file, and the management data may include summary data as well as flow data. The summary data is data 
generated by summarizing the entire packet data, the flow data, and the PE file which are classified as the 
preserved data. In detail, it also provides the user interface to the cause analysis for performing a function of 
analyzing the cause of cyber incidents based on the data collected in the cyber black box system. 
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNICAL FUCTIONS 
In general aspect, a method of collecting evidence data of a cyber intrusion event includes: (1) extracting entire 
packet data from monitored network traffic; (2) analyzing the extracted entire packet data based on an Internet 
protocol (IP), a port, and a protocol to extract, as flow data, a bundle of packet data having the same feature; (3) 
extracting, as a portable executable (PE) file, a bundle of packet data having a PE format from the extracted 
entire packet data; (4) temporarily storing in a buffer, and collecting the extracted entire packet data, flow data, 
and PE file; (5) applying a hash function to each of the temporarily stored entire packet data, flow data, and PE 
file to generate a hash value; and storing, as the evidence data, the generated hash value and the temporarily 
stored entire packet data, flow data, and PE file in a storage unit. Figure2 shows the architecture of the proposed 
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system, called cyber black box. There are two physical systems in the architecture. We describe the detail 
function of each module (block) on the cyber black box system in this section. 
From the figure 2, TFGB (Traffic & Flow Gathering Block) block is able to accommodate 10Gbps network 
traffic via a network interface card (NIC), store collected packets, extract the traffic information of the network 
flow and generate the session data. A method of extracting the flow data can analyze all packet data extracted by 
the packet extraction unit, based on an Internet protocol (IP), a port, and a protocol. It may collect packet data 
having the same feature in units of a certain time, based on a result of the analysis, and may bundle the packet 
data, collected in units of the certain time, in a specific file having the PCAP format to extract one piece of flow 
data (or a flow packet). Another method of extracting the flow data can extract the flow data by sampling a 
certain-rate packet of entire packet data in a deterministic packet sampling scheme. The extracted flow data may 
be temporarily stored in the virtual volume based storage. By connecting a plurality of the hard disk to store a 
total of 10Gbps traffic data without loss of traffic to select a structure for storing in parallel. The hash value 
generating unit may apply a hash function to each of the entire packet data and the flow data to generate a hash 
value (SHA-256), for ensuring data integrity of each of the entire packet data and the flow data which are stored 
in the virtual volume based storage. The generated hash value is also stored in the storage unit and is preserved 
for a long time. 
 
Figure 2: Architecture of the cyber black box for network intrusion forensics 
TFRB (Transmitted File Reconstruction Block) block performs the function of reconstructing the transmitted 
file which is extracted from the stored data collected by TFGB, and performs a function for storing additional 
metadata that is collected from one file reconfiguration. The transmitted file may be the PE (Portable 
Executable) file from the entire packet data extracted from the packet extraction unit. For example, the PE file 
extraction unit may select packets having PE file information (or a PE format) in the entire packet data extracted 
by the packet extraction unit. It also collects all packets having the selected PE file information, and can 
reassemble (or reconfigure) all the collected packets having the PE file information. The extracted PE file is also 
temporarily stored in the virtual volume based storage. TFRB provides the ability to analyze the network service 
protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, FTP, POP3, and so on. It also determines which protocol a file is sent by and 
calculates the hash value (SHA-256) for the file, and stores the metadata information that is collected between 
the extracted files in the directory specified in the csv file format. 
VSMB (Virtual volume based Storage Management Block) block stores the entire packet data, the flow data, and 
the PE file which are encoded by the encoding unit in units of a file as the preserved data. It receives the hash 
value that generated by the hash value generation unit, for each of the entire packet data, the flow data, and the 
PE file. And then it stores the received hash value as evidence data. Moreover, VSMB block supports a write 
once read many (WROM) function to ensure integrity of the stored data in the virtual volume based storage. It 
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also prevents the forgery as well as modification of the data stored in the storage. The entire packet data, the 
flow data, and the PE file that are stored in the VSMB block and are encoded in units of a file can be supplied to 
the server according to a request of the server. That is, when an intrusion event occurs or another necessary case 
occurs, the encoded entire packet data, flow data, and PE file can be supplied to the server as the evidence data 
including at least one of the management data and the preserved data, for analyzing a cause of the intrusion event 
and reproducing the intrusion event. It provides the capability to create or destroy the virtual volumes of the 
storage systems for the data protection as well as the file storage management. 
IASB (Intrusion Analysis & Scenario generation Block) block provides the user interface to perform a function 
of analyzing the cause of the cyber incident based on the data collected in the cyber black box system. That is, it 
provides, as various pieces of visual information, an analysis result of the cause of the intrusion event to a user 
through a GUI. A method of reproducing the cyber incident can extract a cyber-attack scenario (for example, an 
attack time, an IP address where the cyber-attack is performed, and etc.), based on the evidence data which is 
collected at a cyber-attack time. It also reconstructs the cyber-attack scenario based on the extracted information 
and reproduces a corresponding cyber incident according to the reconstructed attack scenario. The result of the 
cause analysis can be supplied to an external system through the external cooperation protocol. The supply of the 
analysis result can be limited in order for the result to be supplied to an authenticated external system. That is, 
the external cooperation system sets a security grade in an external system and gives an appropriate authority to 
the external system according to the set of security grade. The external system may be a security-related system 
provided in a security company, a public institution, a portal company, a general company, and so on. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, we present the experimental results of the cyber black box system. We designed and implemented 
the system using the C programming language on the CentOS Linux 7.1 platform. For all the experiments we 
used a single machine with 64GB DDR3 RAM, two Quad-Core 2.6 Ghz CPUs, 4TB SATA-300 32 MB Buffer 
7200 rpm disk with a RAID-Z configuration.  
 
 
(a)                                                                     (b) 
Figures 3: (a) Experimental Testbed Environment, (b) Network Traffic Throughput Performance test 
For experiments we used the network flow data captured over a 12 hour period of one weekday at our testbed 
environment. In details, we deployed our proposed system in an experimental testbed with monitoring points at 
the network perimeter, in front of warehousing servers, and at the computer Lab as shown in figure 3 (a). We 
simulated the scenario where the attack was not detected by IDSs, but anomalies were discovered later at the 
victim machine. We also conducted the traffic throughput test with an Agilent N2X tool as shown in figure 3 (b).  
It is verified that our proposed system could collect the attack event data and related flow records without the 
loss of network packets in a total of 2Gbps traffic. However, we observed that there were some loss of network 
packets in case that the size of a packet is less than 128 Byte as shown in table 2. 
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 Table 2: Summary of network packet processing performance in a total of 2Gbps traffic 
 
For another experimental results, our proposed system collected at least 400,000 flow records per second and 
stored those data into the virtual volume based storage which supports WORM function. Figure 4 shows the 
experimental results and network traffic throughput performance with 1Gbps LAN optical Interface of N2X tool. 
We also confirmed that TFRB block performed the function of reconstructing the transmitted file which was 
extracted from the stored traffic packets collected by TFGB block, and performed a function for storing 
additional metadata that was collected from one file reconfiguration. 
 
 
Figure 4: The experimental results and network traffic throughput performance 
For the network traffic throughput performance, we used the following formula; 
Rx pps * (Packet Size + 12bytes(Inter Packet Gap) + 7bytes(MAC Preamble size) + 1byte(SFD)) * 8bits 
Packet Size Port  Tx Packets  R x Packets Tx pps R x pps loss(% )
A ll Ports 535,714,286 535,553,897 2,976,190 2,975,299
inbound 267,857,143 267,777,370 1,488,095 1,487,652
outbound 267,857,143 267,776,527 1,488,095 1,487,647
A ll Ports 304,054,056 304,047,383 1,689,189 1,689,152
inbound 152,027,028 152,023,714 844,595 844,576
outbound 152,027,028 152,023,669 844,595 844,576
A ll Ports 163,043,480 163,043,480 905,797 905,797
inbound 81,521,740 81,521,740 452,899 452,899
outbound 81,521,740 81,521,740 452,899 452,899
A ll Ports 84,586,468 84,586,468 469,925 469,925
inbound 42,293,234 42,293,234 234,962 234,962
outbound 42,293,234 42,293,234 234,962 234,962
A ll Ports 43,103,450 43,103,450 239,464 239,464
inbound 21,551,725 21,551,725 119,732 119,732
outbound 21,551,725 21,551,725 119,732 119,732
A ll Ports 29,258,778 29,258,778 162,549 162,549
inbound 14,629,389 14,629,389 81,274 81,274
outbound 14,629,389 14,629,389 81,274 81,274
A ll Ports 55,486,751 55,486,751 308,260 308,260
inbound 27,743,372 27,743,379 154,130 154,130
outbound 27,743,379 27,743,372 154,130 154,130
R andom 0
512 B yte 0
1024 B yte 0
1518 B yte 0
64 B yte 0.02993928
128 B yte 0.00219468
256 B yte 0
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For the overall performance of network traffic processing, we evaluated that our proposed system could keep up 
with traffic rates up to 2.0 Gbps for our experimental implementation. We also measured the maximum 
processing performance by exploiting the various packet size from a N2X tool. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the intrusion cannot be avoided fully, the deployment of intrusion forensics system is needed. As 
described above, in a related research against a cyber-attack, since several months or more are expended in only 
analyzing a cause of an intrusion event and there is no information necessary for analyzing an attack cause, it is 
unable to know the cause of attack even after the intrusion event occurs. However, according to our proposed 
system, entire packet data, flow data, and a PE file can be collected as evidence data from network traffic and 
also stored in the storage medium for a long time, and thus, a cause of an intrusion event is quickly analyzed 
based on the evidence data preserved in the storage medium. This paper described the architecture of cyber black 
box system for network forensics and verified network throughput performance by deploying our proposed 
system in an experimental testbed environment. The future work is the research of the cooperative mechanism 
between our system and the security equipment such as IPSs (Intrusion Prevention Systems), WAFs (Web 
Application Firewalls) and so on. 
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